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Constitutional Law. Almond v. Rhode Island Lottery Commission, 756 A.2d 186 (R.I. 2000). The Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that the Rhode Island General Assembly's creation of the Lottery Commission was a constitutionally lawful delegation of legislative power and did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On April 26, 1999, the Lottery Commission (Commission)
voted five to four to authorize an increase in the number of video
lottery terminals (VLTs) allowed at Newport Grand Jai Alai and
Lincoln Greyhound Park.' The Commission authorized the increase despite the Governor's attempts to oppose it.2 The commissioners who voted in favor of the increase were members of the
Legislature. 3 The commissioners voting against the increase were
appointed by the Governor (and were joined by one member of the
4
Legislature).
After the vote, but before the VLTs were installed, the Governor brought an action for declaratory judgment and sought an injunction against the installation of the VLTs. 5 The superior court
granted the preliminary injunction. 6 The preliminary injunction
was vacated in a supreme court decision.7
In August 1999, the superior court conducted evidentiary
hearings on the matter.8 During this time, the Commission implemented its vote. 9 The superior court denied the Governor's further
request for a preliminary injunction. 10
After the evidentiary hearings, the trial justice ruled that the
plaintiffs separation of powers argument failed'1 according to the
prior Rhode Island Supreme Court opinion, NarragansettIndian
1.

See Almond v. Rhode Island Lottery Comm'n, 756 A.2d 186, 188 (R.I.

2000).
2.
3.
4.

See id.
See id.
See id.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See
See
See
See
See

10.
11.

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

See id.
See id.
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Tribe of Rhode Island v. State.1 2 However, the trial justice ultimately found that the delegation of authority to the Commission
was unconstitutional because of the composition of the Commission (since the majority of the Commission is appointed by the
House Speaker and Senate Majority Leader). 13
BACKGROUND

The General Assembly of Rhode Island has historically authorized and supervised lotteries. 14 In the 1820s, the Rhode Island
General Assembly delegated the supervision of some lotteries to
professional managers. '1 In 1843, after the ratification of the
Rhode Island Constitution, the creation of new lotteries was prohibited. 16 In 1973, the Rhode Constitution was amended, lifting
the ban on lotteries. ' 7 A year later, in 1974, the General Assembly
enacted section 42-61-1.18 This statute created the Lottery Commission (Commission), a nine-member group authorized to manage
state-run lotteries. 19 The statute delegated a number of specific
powers to the Commission. 20 The Commission has been operating
continuously since 1974.21
12. 667 A.2d 280, 281 (R.I. 1995) (holding that "exclusive authority over lotteries is and always has vested in the General Assembly either by Royal Charter or by
Constitution" and that "the Executive Department had no claim to any constitutional power with respect to lotteries and . . . the Governor lacked any implied
powers with respect to lotteries").
13.
14.
15.

See id. at 191.
See Almond, 756 A.2d at 188.
See id.

16. See id.
17. See id.; R.I. Const. of 1843, art. VI, § 15 (amended 1973).
18. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 41-61-1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
19. See id. Section 41-61-1(a) provides that:
[The commission] shall consist of nine (9) members . . . three (3) of
whom shall be members of the senate, not more than two (2) from the
same political party to be appointed by the majority leader; three (3) of
whom shall be members of the house of representatives, not more than
two (2) from the same political party to be appointed by the speaker of the
house; and three (3) of whom shall be representatives of the general public
to be appointed by the governor.
Id.
20.
21.

See Almond, 756 A.2d at 188-90.
See id. at 190.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The court agreed with the trial justice's ruling that the regulation of lotteries by the Rhode Island General Assembly does not
violate the separation of powers principle. 22 The court disagreed
with the trial justice on the delegation issue, holding that the delegation of power to the Commission was constitutional.2 3 The court
looked at the particular delegation in this case and found that it
provided specific and detailed guidelines to the Commission. 24 The
court also found that the delegation was necessary in this case, as
the Legislature would not have been able to "operate such a mas25
sive enterprise" without delegation.
Speaking to the composition of the Commission issue relied on
by the trial judge, the court refused to force the Legislature to delegate its power to only judicially approved members. 26 The court
felt that this type of judicial intervention would give rise to separation of powers issues.2 7 Finally, after looking specifically at the
Rhode Island Constitution, the court concluded, "nothing in the
Rhode Island Constitution prohibits the appointment of legislators
or their designees to an administrative agency to which the Legislature has delegated a portion of its power to administer and regulate lotteries in this state."28 The court reversed the superior
court's declaratory judgment and affirmed the part of the judgment
29
that denied injunctive relief to the plaintiffs.
The Dissent
Justice Flanders dissented. 30 He argued that affirming the
trial justice's decision would not prohibit the General Assembly
from properly delegating its powers, it would only prevent the Legislature from improperly "self-delegating its power to legislatordominated entities like the present Lottery Commission" which are
only "subparts and constituent elements of the Rhode Island Gen22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See id. at 191.
See id. at 191-92.
See id. at 192.
Id.
See id. at 193.
See id.
Id. at 196.
See id. at 197.
See id.
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eral Assembly itself."3 1 He argued that the delegation circumvented the procedural and oversight safeguards present in the
Rhode Island Constitution.3 2
CONCLUSION

In Almond v. Rhode IslandLottery Commission, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Rhode Island General Assembly's creation of the Lottery Commission was a constitutionally
lawful delegation of legislative power and did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
Tanya J. Zorabedian

31. Id. at 199.
32. See id. at 200-09.
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Constitutional Law. El Marocco Club, Inc. v. Richardson, 746
A.2d 1228 (R.I. 2000). Municipalities have the authority to issue,
maintain, and place reasonable restrictions on liquor licenses, including the limited restriction of the constitutionally protected activity of nude dancing as long as the purpose for such restriction
serves a substantial government interest and is narrowly tailored
to achieve that goal.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

El Marocco, operating under a Class B liquor license,' served
alcoholic beverages for consumption and provided nude entertainment at no additional charge. 2 On March 27, 1997, Johnston police ordered the El Marocco Club, Inc. (El Marocco) to refrain from
featuring nude dancers, as such conduct was in violation of a town
3
ordinance prohibiting nudity at establishments serving liquor.
Asserting that the ordinance was invalid, El Marocco sought injunctive relief and damages for the loss of business. 4 The superior
court denied El Marocco's motion for temporary injunction and
ruled in favor of the Town of Johnston's (Town) motion for summary judgment. 5 El Marocco appealed that ruling to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court arguing that the Town did not have the authority to adopt the ordinance and, even if it had the authority, the
ordinance violated El Marocco's First and Fourteenth Amendment
6
rights.
El Marocco's first argument was that the state law that specifically granted municipalities the power to restrict entertainment
at facilities holding a Class B liquor license did not exist when the
Town adopted the ordinance at issue and, therefore, the Town did
not have the authority to adopt and enforce the ordinance.7 El
Marocco's second challenge to the validity of the ordinance was
that the Town is preempted from regulating in the area because
the General Assembly has regulated this area through state law.8
1.
2000).

See El Marocco Club, Inc. v. Richardson, 746 A.2d 1228, 1231 n.4 (R.I.

2.
3.

See id. at 1232.
See id. at 1230.

4.

See id.

5.
6.
7.
8.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id. at 1230-31.
id. at 1231-32.
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El Marocco's final assertion regarding validity was that the Town
should be equitably estopped from enforcing this ordinance against
El Marocco because the nightclub had made future plans and preparations relying on the fact the Town had placed no such restriction on the establishment. 9
The constitutional argument El Marocco put forth was that
prohibition is a content-based restriction in violation
ordinance
the
of the First Amendment right to free speech. 10 El Marocco asserted that the Town enacted the ordinance without having any
evidence of the adverse effects of nudity in a liquor-serving estabTherefore, such content-based regulation is
lishment."
12
impermissible.
BACKGROUND

The Town of Johnston enacted Ordinance No. 965 in early
13
1996 that prohibits nudity at liquor-serving establishments.
This ordinance was reenacted in January of 1997.14 Prior to the
Town's adoption of this prohibition, the Town held public hearings
during which Town officials heard from concerned community
members and examined the experiences of other Towns and cities
faced with the same issue.1' This ordinance was adopted prior to
the General Assembly's 1997 amendment to section 3-7-7.3 empowering municipalities to restrict or prohibit entertainment at facilities with a Class B liquor license. 16 One year after this specific
grant of authority came into effect the Town adopted Ordinance
No. 1057, which was identical to No. 965.17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The court deemed El Marocco's challenge to the validity of Ordinance No. 965 moot because the Town adopted Ordinance No.
1057, which was identical to No. 965, after section 3-7-7.3 became
9. See id. at 1233.
10. See id. at 1234.
11. See id. at 1235.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 1230 n.2.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 1237.
16. See id. at 1230-31.
17. See id. at 1231.
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effective. Therefore, the Town had explicit authority to act.' 8 Furthermore, municipalities have the statutory authority, without
section 3-7-7.3, to impose reasonable conditions on liquor licenses. 19 The Town's prohibition of nudity at establishments serving alcohol is a reasonable condition on El Marocco's liquor
license. 20 Ordinance Nos. 965 and 1057 are simply codifications of
the Town's preexisting authority to impose reasonable conditions
21
on Class B liquor licenses.
In response to El Marocco's claim that the Town is preempted
from regulating in the area of entertainment, the court found that
the General Assembly had no intention of regulating all entertainment at liquor-serving facilities. 2 2 Because there was no indication that the state wished to occupy the entire field of liquor license
regulation, and because there were no conflicts between state and
local laws, there was no preemption. 2 3 The sections of the Rhode
Island law that El Marocco points to in support of preemption are
section 3-7-7(a)(3), which applies when admission to an establishment serving alcohol and featuring nudity entails the payment of a
separate fee or charge (which is different than El Marocco's practice) and section 3-7-7.3.24 The court found that section 3-7-7 did
not attempt to regulate all types of entertainment in facilities holding liquor licenses. In fact, the General Assembly expressly and
clearly delegated its licensing power to local licensing boards and
allowed such boards to suspend licenses for the violation of
25
conditions.
The equitable estoppel argument failed as well because El
Marocco failed to show that: (1) a Town official affirmatively stated
that El Marocco would be allowed to continue featuring nude dancers; (2) that such statements were designed to influence the nightclub; and (3) that El Marocco relied on those affirmations to its
detriment. 26 The fact that the municipality failed to impose licens18.
19.
1986)).
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
1970)).
25.
26.

See id.
See id. (citing Thompson v. Town of East Greenwich, 512 A.2d 837 (R.I.
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 1231.
id. at 1233.
id.
id. at 1232.
id. (citing Chevron Enters., Inc. v. Scuncio, 268 A.2d 424, 427 (R.I.

See id.
See id. at 1234.
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ing restrictions in the past does not mean that such failure is an
affirmation that restrictions will not be imposed in the future. 27 El
Marocco is part of a highly regulated industry in which the establishment's license is subject to an annual review. It is not uncommon and El Marocco should have been aware that the new
restrictions could be placed on that license at any time. 28
El Marocco's constitutional plea was also unpersuasive. Nude
barroom dancing as a First Amendment activity "falls, at most,
only 'marginally' within the 'outer perimeters' of the First Amendment."29 If the restriction was based on the content of the regulated activity, then there might potentially be a violation of this
marginally protected right.30 However, the ordinances in question,
Nos. 965 and 1057, restrict only the time, place and manner in
which nudity can be featured. There was no blanket prohibition of
nudity in the ordinance. 3 ' The purpose of the ordinances was to
avoid the undesirable secondary effects of featuring nudity at a liquor-serving establishment. 3 2 Content-neutral restrictions like
those in the ordinances at issue are constitutional so long as they
are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest
and leave open alternative forms of communication. 33 The purpose
described above was a substantial government interest and the ordinances were narrowly tailored to achieve that goal by restricting
34
only time, place and manner.
The court continued its examination of the ordinances under
the four-part intermediate scrutiny test as applied to symbolic content and concluded that the Town's ordinances were within constitutional limits. 3 5 First, the restriction was within the Town's
constitutional powers because the state delegated its licensing and
enforcement authority to municipalities. 36 Evidence of that au27.
28.
29.
(1991)).
30.
31.
32.
33.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 1235 (quoting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1235-36 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475

U.S. 41, 47 (1986)).
34.
35.

See id. at 1235.
See id. at 1236 (referring to the four-part test set forth in United States v.

O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
36. See id.

626 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:593
thority was found in the Town's authority to place reasonable restrictions on the issuance and maintenance of liquor licenses
coupled with the 1997 amendment to section 3-7-7.3 delegating the
37
state's Twenty-first Amendment power to the Towns.
Second, the regulation furthered the substantial government
interest of promoting societal order and morality and maintaining
health safety and welfare. 3 8 The narrowly tailored content-neutral
regulation of time, place and manner will serve the government
interest.3 9 El Marocco argued that the Town lacked the necessary
evidence to conclude the potential harm in allowing nudity in establishments serving alcohol. 40 The court found that the Town's
reliance on the experience of other Towns and cities was estab41
lished to determine the possible detrimental effects.
Third, the Town's intent to promote societal order and moral42
ity was unrelated to the suppression of freedom of expression.
The ordinances did not prohibit nudity and nude dancing altogether, rather, they merely prohibited such dancing in commercial
settings where alcohol is being served. 43 Finally, the free speech
rights implicated were outweighed by the Town's legitimate interest in the safety and welfare of its citizens. 44 The restriction was
45
sufficiently limited to achieving this end.

CONCLUSION

In El Marocco Club, Inc. v. Richardson,the Rhode Island Supreme Court emphasized the autonomy of the state's municipalities in the policies surrounding the issuance and maintenance of
liquor licenses. First, this decision affirms the licensing authority
of towns and cities in Rhode Island. Second, this decision allows
municipalities to create laws to legislate morality that implicate
First Amendment concerns so long as the municipality can formu37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-7-7.3 (1956) (1998 Reenactment).
El Marocco, 746 A.2d at 1236.
id.
id. at 1237.
id. at 1237-38.
id. at 1238.
id.
id.
id.
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late a purpose unrelated to the prohibition of the activity itself and
the restriction is not too sweeping.
Dena M. Castricone
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Constitutional Law. Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Mallette,
762 A.2d 1208 (R.I. 2000). A neighbor's statements made to a
newspaper reporter about a facility that recycles construction and
demolition debris were found to be immune from liability as provided in the anti-SLAPP statute. The statements were not objectively baseless and therefore, were not a sham outside the
immunity provided by the statute. The term "issues of public concern" used in the statute is not overly broad or ambiguous, and
does not violate due process.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Plaintiff-Appellant Global Waste Recycling, Inc. (Global) had
been operating an unlicensed construction and demolition debris
recycling facility since June 1995.1 The facility, located on a residentially-zoned street in the town of Coventry, was operating
under a Department of Environmental Management (DEM) conditional permit that required Global to comply with an operating
plan set forth under a settlement agreement with DEM. 2 On December 1996, Global was notified by DEM that violations of the
operation plan were observed, including violations concerning a
large amount of processed construction and demolition material
3
being left on site rather than processed and recycled as agreed.
The defendant-appellees Henry and Marcia Mallette, Jr. (Mallettes) had also observed the expanding construction and demolition
material stockpiles on the Global site since their residence adjoins
it. 4 The Mallettes were concerned about the possibility of contamination of their well water, airborne pollutants from the composted
materials left on site and of the fire hazard created by the stockpiled debris. 5 Because of such concerns, the Mallettes and fortytwo other Colvintown Road residents filed a petition with the Cov1.

See Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Mallette, 762 A.2d 1208, 1209 (R.I.

2000).
2. The prior operators of the Colvintown Road facility, Bettez, had been ordered by a final DEM agency decision to cease receiving materials, to dispose of
materials on site, and to pay an administrative remedy to DEM after notices of

violation and a hearing was held on the improper operations of its unlicensed landfill. Global intervened in Bettez's administrative appeal with the interest of operating on the Bettez property site, and negotiated a settlement with DEM as
evidenced by a consent judgment. See id.
3. See Global Waste, 762 A.2d at 1209.
4. See id.
5. See id.
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entry Town Council seeking relief from further expansion of those
6
conditions at Global's facility.
Just as the Colvintown Road residents had feared, a fire broke
out on Global's site in July 1997. 7 By the Coventry fire chiefs and
police's accounts, the fire lasted two and a half hours, created
heavy, dark smoke over the area and required twelve additional
fire departments to respond.8 During the fire, a news reporter
from the local Kent County Daily Times interviewed several onlooking local residents. 9 Henry Mallette, Jr. was interviewed and
was reported to have said, "[wiho knows what they're burning over
there. They say its mulch, but I know what it is. It's lead and
asbestos and every other thing."10 His wife, Marcia Mallette,
spoke with reporters eight days later for a follow-up story on
Global's operation and the ongoing neighborhood concerns." Her
comment that "[olld homes are taken in there and piled up, they
just sit there. I don't think any recycling is going on" was reported
in the Kent County Daily Times in August, 1997.12 Three days
later, Global initiated a civil action against the Mallettes for defamation, claiming that its business and its reputation had been destroyed by the publication of the Mallette's statements and seeking
both economic and punitive damages.13 Four months later, a superior court hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of
the Mallettes. 1 4 The justice found that Global's action constituted
an attempt by Global to silence legitimate statements on a matter
of public concern. 15 Consequently, the civil action was barred by
6. See id.
7. See id. at 1210.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Id. In an affidavit, Mallette said he was misquoted and that what he told
the reporter was: "God knows what's burning. There's lead and asbestos and who
knows what else in those piles." Id. at n.1.
11. See id. at 1210.
12. Id. The supreme court noted that the Mallettes had previously received a
copy of DEM's letter to Global advising Global that the inspector observed large
amounts of construction and demolition material not leaving the site. The letter
warned that failure to reuse this material would be considered by DEM to constitute the unpermitted disposal of solid waste. This seemingly provided some basis
for the Mallettes' statements. See id. at n.2.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
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virtue of the provisions of the anti-SLAPP statute. 16 A final judgment in the case granted summary judgment and counsel fees
against Global. 1 7 Global's present appeal followed twelve days
later.18
The anti-SLAPP statute was determined to be constitutional
in the 1996 Rhode Island Supreme Court decision of Hometown
Properties,Inc. v. Fleming.19 That court found that the statute
was intended to provide conditional immunity to any person exercising his or her right of petition or free speech under the United
States or Rhode Island Constitution concerning matters of public
concern. 20 This conditional immunity would render the speaker
immune from any civil claims for statements, or petitions, that
were not sham by virtue of being objectively or subjectively baseless. 2 ' Relying on section 9-33-2 of the anti-SLAPP statute, the
superior court justice found the Mallettes' statements neither objectively sham nor actionable; 22 she found the statements were afforded immunity protection. 2 3 This conclusion was based on her
determination that the comments were made on an issue that is
clearly one of public concern. 2 4 Not only was the operation of a 94acre recycling plant a matter of public concern, but so was the issue of recycling, which had been the subject of both DEM proceedings and a local Town Council petition. 25 Additionally, the
superior court justice relied on her belief that the Mallettes' remarks were typical of those made regularly by citizens, taxpayers,
16. See id. at 1211-12.
17. See Global Waste, 762 A.2d at 1210.
18. See id.
19. See Hometown Props., Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1996).
20. See Global Waste, 762 A.2d at 1211. The court describes how the antiSLAPP statute was intended to emulate the federal Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
See id. at 1211 n.3.
21. See id. The definition of a sham statement or petition can be found in
section 9-33- 2 (a) of the anti-SLAPP statute. This section allows a finding of an
objectively baseless statement when no reasonable person exercising the right of
speech could realistically expect success in procuring government action, result, or
outcome. A statement may be determined as subjectively baseless if the speaker's
intention was to use the governmental process itself for the statement's own direct
effects. However, use of outcome or result of the governmental process is not to be
construed as using the process for its own "direct effects." See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
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neighbors and residents of a community wishing to encourage governmental action or resolution of concerns, that newspapers are a
typical medium used for this purpose, and that the Mallettes could
26
realistically have expected some success by utilizing this method.
Also, the Mallettes were reasonably relying on their own personal
observations and the information obtained from the DEM when
27
making the statements to the newspaper reporter.
On appeal, Global challenged the grant of summary judgment
in favor of the Mallettes. 28 Global asserted three contentions to
support this position. 29 In the first, Global asserted that the antiSLAPP policy was not intended to bar claims for tortious actions
brought by a litigant having "suffered actual economic injuries
from baseless attacks upon [its] business reputation."3 0 Second,
the Mallette statements were not made at a "judicial, administrative or legislative proceeding."3 1 Lastly, the term "issues of public
concern" found in the anti-SLAPP statute is void as being uncon32
stitutionally vague.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the grant of the
motion for summary judgment on a de novo basis.3 3 Following
that review, the court determined that the hearing justice did not
err and that summary judgment was appropriately granted in
favor of the Mallettes as a matter of law. 3 4 The court found that
Global had misstated both the material facts and the provisions of
section 9-33-2(a) when drafting its appellate issues, and that all
three issues were without merit.3 5
Addressing issue one, the court determined that Global's contention, that the anti-SLAPP statute was never intended to bar a
civil action by one suffering economic injuries from baseless at26.
27.
28.
29.

See id.
See id. at 1212.
See id.
See id.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Macera Brothers of Cranston, Inc. v. Gelfuso & Lachut, Inc., 740 A.2d
1262, 1264 (R.I. 1999).
34. See id.
35. See id.
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tacks upon business reputation, would only have merit if the facts
in this case warranted an inference that the statements were baseless or sham when made.3 6 The court came to the same conclusion
as the hearing justice, that the statements were not objectively
baseless and not a sham. 37 The supreme court agreed that consequently, Global's suit was barred by the express immunity provisions of section 9-33-2(a).38 Global's first appellate assertion of
error was rejected as meritless. 39
The supreme court found the second contention to be novel
and meritless. 40 The Legislature's intention for enacting the antiSLAPP statute was not only to allow "full participation by persons
and organizations and robust discussion of issues of public concern
before the legislative, judicial, and administrative bodies," but also
"in other public fora."4 1 Section 9-33-1 made clear the Legislature's disfavor of lawsuits brought in order to obstruct the valid
exercise of freedom of speech by persons making public statements
regarding issues of public concern. 42 The court also noted that the
Legislature deliberately amended section 9-33-2 to provide explicit
immunity to those making statements not objectively or subjectively baseless in a discussion of public concern. 43 Global's contention was a misread and a misinterpretation of the purpose and
policy behind the anti-SLAPP statute. As it had in Global's first
assertion, the supreme court reaffirmed the hearing justice's finding that the Mallette's statements were not objectively baseless
and that the Mallettes were protected from Global's alleged defamation claims under the immunity granted in the anti-SLAPP
statute." The court noted that Global, rather than the Mallettes,
was potentially the more culpable party, as Global had not yet removed the stockpiles at issue, and could be subject to an action for
45
private nuisance.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 1213.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. (citing Hometown, 680 A.2d at 56).
See Global Waste, 762 A.2d at 1213.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Lastly, the court addressed the constitutionality of the term
"issues of public concern" contained in the anti-SLAPP statute. It
held that such terminology is not overly broad, ambiguous or without concrete meaning as Global contented. 46 The court cited a
comprehensive and distinguished list of statutory and case law to
support the reality that such phrasing and wording enjoys a long,
unchallenged career in both state and civil defamation and tortious
conduct actions. 4 7 Additionally, Global had the obligation of serving the Attorney General with a copy of the proceedings within a
time frame so that the Attorney General could intervene.' 8 This is
required whenever the constitutionality of a state statute is challenged, 4 9 and Global failed to fulfill this requirement. 50 Therefore,
the court would be hesitant to determine the constitutionality of a
state statute in any given case, including this case, without first
affording the Attorney General the opportunity to intervene and be
heard. 5 1 This would have hindered Global's appeal even if the issue were meritorious.
In addition to denying and dismissing Global's appeal and affirming the summary judgment and trial counsel fees in favor of
the Mallettes, the court directed the Mallettes' appellate counsel to
submit a request for counsel fees. 5 2 Upon consideration of the request and objection, the court would thereby award an appropriate
fee to the Mallettes' counsel. 53
CONCLUSION

In Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Mallette, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court affirmed the grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of two Coventry residents sued in an action for defamation. Statements made to and later printed by a local
newspaper reporter, by neighbors concerned about the violations
and hazards of a nearby recycling facility, were held immune from
liability as provided by the anti-SLAPP statute. The statements
46. See id. at 1214.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. Authority for this requirement can be found in R.I. Super. R. Civ.
P. 24(d) and R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-30-11 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
50. See Global Waste, 762 A.2d at 1214.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
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were not objectively baseless, this finding being one conditional obstacle to overcome in order to receive protection from the statute.
Additionally, the statements pertained to issues of public concern,
another condition of the statute. The term "issues of public concern," is not overly broad or ambiguous, and therefore not unconstitutional. Any determination of the constitutionality of a state
statute should be undertaken only when the Attorney General has
been afforded the opportunity to intervene and be heard.
Christy Hetherington

